USX Corporation v. Dick Lawrence Brown, Industrial Commission of Utah : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
USX Corporation v. Dick Lawrence Brown,
Industrial Commission of Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James M. Elegante; William J. Evans; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Christopher A. Conkling; Attorneys
for Petitioner.
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker; Attorney for Respondents.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, USX Corporation v. Dick Lawrence Brown, Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 890011 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1512
UTAH COURT OF APPALS 
UTAH Lh 
DOCliiviENT 
K F U 
50 
DOL W / ^ ^ H I N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
USX CORPORATION, (SELF-INSURED), 
Petitioner-Defendant, 
vs. 
DICK LAWRENCE BROWN, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent-Applicant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
USX CORPORATION 
Case No. 890011-CA 
Case Priority # 6 
* * * * * * * * 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
REVIEW FROM THE DECEMBER 6, 1988 ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH GRANTING 
APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER 
42 North University, Suite 1 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent-
Applicant 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE (A0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (A5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
CHRISTOPHER A. CONKLING 
USX CORPORATION 
50 California Street 
San Francisco, CA 91111 
Telephone: (415) 956-4116 
Attorneys for Petitioner-
Defendant 
MB7 1989 
, ,jT!?o f , h» Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
' k ' k ' k ' k i e i e - k - k 
USX CORPORATION, (SELF-INSURED), 
Petitioner-Defendant, 
vs. 
DICK LAWRENCE BROWN, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent-Applicant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
USX CORPORATION 
Case No. 890011-CA 
Case Priority # 6 
* * * * * * * * 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
REVIEW FROM THE DECEMBER 6, 1988 ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH GRANTING 
APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER 
42 North University, Suite 1 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent-
Applicant 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE (A0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (A5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
CHRISTOPHER A. CONKLING 
USX CORPORATION 
50 California Street 
San Francisco, CA 91111 
Telephone: (415) 956-4116 
Attorneys for Petitioner-
Defendant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE MEDICAL'S PANEL REPORT IS WITHOUT ANY 
REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE 2 
II. THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT 
RESPONDENT'S INJURY WAS CAUSED BY HIS EMPLOY-
MENT ACTIVITY 3 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER HAS 
DEPRIVED USX OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 6 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES ACT 6 
CONCLUSION 7 
(i) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Allen G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1984) 6 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) 1,4 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986) 2 
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) ..4 
Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1986 ) 4 
Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1986) 5 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69(1) (1988) 5 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(6) (c)(v) 1,6 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10 6 
(ii) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Applicant's 
Motion for Review, is without a reasonable basis in the the evi-
dence. The evidence clearly indicates that applicant suffers 
fifteen percent (15%) permanent partial disability as a result of 
his work-related injuries. The Industrial Commission's award of 
permanent total disability benefits is supportable only by the 
most arbitrary and unreasonable reading of the Medical Panel 
Report and therefore it must be set aside. 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), is applicable in the present case because Respondent's 
back injury constitutes precisely the type of internal failure 
that Allen addresses. In any event, Respondent cannot recover 
from USX for his disability unless he can show that his indus-
trial accident was the medical cause of the disability. 
In interpreting the Medical Panel Report, the Commis-
sion introduced an ambiguity, and therefore a question of fact, 
that was not present before the Administrative Law Judge. 
Because the ambiguity was administratively created after the 
report had already been admitted in evidence, USX has been 
deprived of its right to cross-examine the witnesses against it 
in connection with the newly raised questions of fact. 
Finally, the Commission has not complied with Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(v) which requires that the Commission 
give the reasons for its disposition of the case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
MEDICAL'S PANEL REPORT IS WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE BASIS 
IN THE EVIDENCE. 
Decisions of the Industrial Commission may be set aside 
if they are "arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and 
capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or without any 
reasonable basis in the evidence." Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 
P. 2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986). The Industrial Commission's decision 
in this case is based entirely on language which the Commission 
interpreted contrary to the entirety of the evidence, thus creat-
ing an ambiguity where none had existed before. The medical 
panel found that Respondent's back injury resulting from the 1986 
accident was a significant factor only in connection with his 
partial disability rating and that it was not the cause of his 
permanent total disability. The panel assigned a fifteen percent 
(15%) permanent impairment rating for his back problem, five per-
cent (5%) due to pre-existing conditions and ten percent (10%) 
directly related to the industrial accident. (Medical Panel 
Report, at 7.) The medical report concluded with the following 
language: 
It should mentioned that the Panel felt that 
Respondent would never be able to return to the 
work force in any capacity unless he has signifi-
cant remission in his rheumatoid disease. With a 
remission he would still not be able to do any-
thing that required light labor. 
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Id. Rather than interpreting the above-quoted passage consis-
tently with the rest of the evidence, the Commission, taking the 
final statement out of context of the report, found that it 
required an award based on permanent total disability. To reach 
its conclusion, the Commission gave the report the most unlikely 
and unreasonable interpretation possible. Thus, the Commission's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious and its Order Granting 
Applicant's Motion for Review should be reversed. 
II. THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT 
RESPONDENT'S INJURY WAS CAUSED BY HIS EMPLOY-
MENT ACTIVITY. 
Respondent argues in his brief that he meets the legal 
standards for permanent and total disability, and that the 
reports of various doctors support an award of permanent total 
impairment. Petitioner, USX, does not contend that Respondent is 
not impaired, but rather that his impairment is not due to his 
employment at USX. There is simply no evidence of any causal 
connection between his work-related activities and his total 
disability. 
At the time of the accident, Respondent was already 
afflicted with arthritis and, as he points out in his Reply 
Brief, approximately one month after his most recent industrial 
accident, he was diagnosed as having "severe degenerative arthri-
tis with total destruction of the right hip. . . " (Brief of 
Respondent at 13-14 (quoting Dr. Bromley's report at R.48.)) 
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Although Respondent is correct in asserting that his 
arthritis does not necessarily preclude an award of benefits, 
Respondent may not recover benefits from USX for his arthritis. 
He is entitled to recover benefits from USX only to the extent 
his disability resulted from his employment. In Large v. 
Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988), the claim-
ant suffered a 10% permanent disability attributable to a slip 
and fall accident on the job. Although the claimant was totally 
disabled due to "age, obesity, lack of transferable skills and 
prior back surgery," the court upheld a denial of permanent total 
disability benefits because the claimant's total disability was 
"the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial 
accident." Id. at 957. A denial of benefits was upheld on the 
same grounds in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 
718, 721 (Utah 1986), where the court stated: "While it is 
unquestioned that the medical panel found [the claimant] to be 
one hundred percent physically impaired, the panel also found 
that the total impairment was due to the onset of severe 
arthritic problems." See also Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15,18 (Utah 1986) (there must be a sufficient causal 
connection between the disability and the working conditions). 
Although the respondent is correct in stating that 
two-thirds of his back problems are related to his 1986 indus-
trial accident, it is clear from the record that his back prob-
lems are not the cause of his total disability. The specific 
-4-
finding of the medical panel in that regard is that Respondent is 
fifteen (15%) permanently partially disabled due to his back 
injury at USX: ten percent (10%) directly due to the back injury 
and five percent (5%) due to "lighting up" of an earlier back 
injury. (Medical Panel Report at 7.) The panel also specifi-
cally found that Respondent's back injury did not aggravate or 
light up the arthritis. 
Given the totality of the evidence, the ALJ correctly 
concluded that "the applicant has not established] that his 
present disability is due to the industrial accident." (Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at 4.) USX's liability, 
if any, must be limited to benefits for the industrial injury. 
If indeed Respondent is permanently totally disabled, compensa-
tion for that portion of his disability not arising from the 
industrial accident must come from the Second Injury Fund. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69(1) (Supp. 1987) (as amended 1984)(when 
permanent total incapacity results from a combination of disease 
and industrial accident, "liability of the employer . . . shall 
be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid 
out of the Second Injury Fund . . . " ) . The Commission's award 
1
 The quoted language is from the 1984 version of §35-1-69(1) 
which was repealed when the current version became effective on 
July 1, 1988. Because this action arose before that date, it is 
governed by the 1984 version of §35-1-69. See Carlucci v. Utah 
State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) (law establishing 
substantive rights and liabilities is statute in force when cause 
of action arises). 
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of permanent total disability benefits should be reversed because 
there is no evidence that Respondent's employment was causally 
connected to his total disability. 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER HAS 
DEPRIVED USX OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
In his brief, Respondent asserts that because neither 
party objected to admission of the Medical Panel Report, USX is 
now precluded from claiming a violation of its right to due 
process. As explained in Section I of this brief, however, the 
unreasonable and arbitrary interpretation of the Medical Panel 
Report by the Industrial Commission raised a question of fact 
that was not present in the proceedings below. USX, therefore, 
had no opportunity for a meaningful hearing on the issue raised 
solely by the commission. If the Court allows the Industrial 
Commission's interpretation of the report to stand, USX will have 
been deprived of due process. 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
Respondent correctly points out that Petitioner should 
have cited section 63-46b-12 of the Utah Code rather than 
section 63-46b-10 for the proposition that the Commission must 
base its decision on the record and give reasons therefor sup-
ported by facts from the record. Respondent, however, in quoting 
section 63-46b-12(6)(c) has omitted subsection (v) which states 
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that the Commission's order on review must contain the reasons 
for the particular disposition of the case. 
As explained in Section I of this brief and in the 
Brief of Petitioner submitted to this Court on May 10, 1989, the 
Commission relied on inferences that are not adequately supported 
by the facts from the record. It gave no reasons for reaching a 
conclusion contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence and, 
instead, simply stated that the last sentence of the report could 
not be overlooked. (Order Granting Applicants Motion for Review, 
at 2.) Because the Commission's order was without a reasonable 
basis in the evidence, and because the Commission failed to give 
reasons for its decision, the Order Granting Applicant's Motion 
For Review must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's decision in granting 
applicants motion for review was arbitrary and capricious because 
it was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts of 
record. There is simply insufficient evidence to show that 
Respondent's disability was caused by his employment activity. 
In addition, the ambiguous interpretation of the 
Medical Panel Report raised a question of fact not present in the 
proceedings below. Because the issue arose only after the report 
had been adopted by the ALJ, USX has been deprived of its right 
to due process. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Commission's 
Order Granting Applicant's Motion for Review should be reversed. 
At the very least, the case should be remanded for clarification 
of the Medical Panel Report. 
DATED this Q&. day of August, 1989. 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (Supp. 1987) (as amended 1984): 
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent 
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, 
sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation or 
medical care, or both, is provided by this chapter that results 
in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he 
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapac-
ity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items 
as outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for such 
compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be for 
the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of 
the Second Injury Fund as provided for in Subsection 35-1-68(1), 
and shall be determined after assigning the impairment for the 
industrial injury on a whole person uncombined basis and then 
deducting this percentage from the total combined rating. This 
combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(6)(c)(1988): 
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or 
requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) finding of facts as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or 
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether 
all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or 
review. 
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